Abstract
Introduction
Gold is by far the most important mineral in Ghana, which is Africa's second-biggest producer of gold after South Africa. 2 The Ahafo gold mine, a 100% Newmont-owned project, is located in a densely populated, rural area in the Brong-Ahafo region, the Asutifi district, in central Ghana. Newmont's exploitation is a large one and because of using surface-mining technology it displaced a considerable number of people. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, to set the record straight on the land dispossession issue. Much has happened around the Ahafo project since [2003] [2004] and in the last few years Newmont has received accolades for its CSR efforts. 4 It is unusual to find a mining company employing 130 staff only in its Environmental and Social Relations (ESR) department, setting up ten multistakeholder committees covering areas such as compensation, gender, agricultural inputs, social development etc, 5 and publicly releasing documentation that takes one more than a week full-time to read. 6 However, these commendable initiatives did not exist when the mine started, people were dispossessed of their land without compensation and it was not at all clear what, if anything would be done to restore their livelihood. These facts have not been properly documented in the CSR literature and thus leave a gap in anyone's attempts to understand Newmont's CSR operations at Ahafo. Second, exposing wrongdoing at a certain point in time is important; equally important is to grasp the process of change through which the people living in vicinity struggle to improve their lives.
Only the issue of compensation for land will be detailed in this article; this is not a comprehensive treatment of the various impacts of mining and of CSR initiatives undertaken at Ahafo. Indeed, a multitude of impacts and flashpoints exist: local employment (especially of the youth), compensation, access to water, access to land, inward migration, rising prices, artisanal miners, security issues, tax exemptions, procurement and awarding of contracts, resettlement facilities, effectiveness of various social programs undertaken by the company, cultural change following arrival of a large industrial complex, etc. 
The Ahafo context
The Ahafo project, on which exploration began in late 1990s, delivered its first gold in 2006
and is expected to last for 20 years. 8 As this is an 'open-pit' mining project, it automatically makes use of much more land than underground mining; 9 the mining facilities cover 2,426 hectares of farmland. As a result, a large number of people have been impacted. At Ahafo, the company displaced around 10.000 people and classified ten communities in the vicinity of the mining installations as 'directly impacted' by the project. The current project at Ahafo (Ahafo South -Stage I) is set to expand in coming years (Ahafo North -Stage II) with roughly 10.000 people more expected to be displaced. Newmont 10 is the largest employer in the region directly employing 2000 people while its contractors employ another 2000 people. It produces half a million of ounces of gold a year. 11 Newmont's Ahafo mine is the second largest gold producer in Ghana after Goldfields' Tarkwa mine. 12 The impacts of such a large mine in a heavily populated area are correspondingly significant and varied. The local economy is predominantly agrarian with 77% of the employed working-age population in agriculture and 96% of those employed in other sectors identifying agriculture as their secondary occupation. 13 The Opportunities Industrialization Centers International (OICI), a US-based NGO active at Ahafo, articulated a profile of the affected people:
The populations residing in this concession area are in general poor subsistence farmers, with low incomes due to low production on small family farms, limited non-farm income generating opportunities, and low educational status. The welfare profile (quality of life indices) of the local villages is extremely low and some basic facilities such as potable water supply, sanitation and health facilities are not available. The communities, in general, are highly dependent on subsistence-farming, and exploitation of forestry products and only a few community members are directly employed or even "employable" by any industry and the mine due to the low level of skills available in the communities. households (9,575 people), of which 823 households (5,185 people) were physically displaced as they lost both residential buildings and cropped fields in the Mine Area and 878 households (4,390 people) became economically displaced through the loss of cropped fields. 16 Of the physically displaced, a majority have been provided with new houses in the two main resettlement sites at Ntotoroso and Kenyase with the rest choosing to relocate on their own and get compensation in cash. Both the resettled and the economically displaced can become 20 On the other hand, only speculative structures, that is, those that people build for the sole purpose of getting compensation rather than inhabitancy and normal use, continue to raise tensions; this raises only logistical challenges to the company as they are built by the hundreds in a short period of time, but the principle is clear: speculative structures do not give rights to compensation after the cut-off date. Finally, the lack of compensation paid to households for agricultural land has been highly contentious. This has been possible due to inadequacies in Ghanaian laws, some of them being changed with the arrival of the new Mining Law in 2006.
Another distinction worth making regarding the contentious issue of compensation for land at Ahafo refers to the type of agricultural land: land that is actually used to grow crops and, under the rotational crops of agriculture, land that is left unused for several years to regain fertility. The latter is referred to as uncropped land or 'fallow' land.
Numerous writings on the Ahafo project discuss in detail whether and how to compensate for fallow land 21 and this could create the impression that cropped land has been compensated. This is not the case: both types of land were not compensated.
Corporate reasoning for not compensating
How come that a well-known international company 22 with its own CSR statements 23 sets up a project that displaces subsistence farmers from their land without compensating or providing them with replacement land? The key factors are discussed below.
Keeping the costs down
During an interview in Accra, a high level manager who was not at the site during the compensation negotiations in 2003-4, answered the question whether there was an internal division between the ESR staff and the rest of the management over the issue of land compensation as following: 'I don't think it was any division, it was just a matter of we had to keep our costs down to make the project economic and we had to follow the law. Those were the two drivers that were framing what we were trying to do…' 24
Following the law
Without having a chance to analyse the legal instrument that transferred land to the mining project 25 it is difficult to clarify in detail legal aspects of the land transfer. 26 This notwithstanding, the possible legal grounds can be identified, and the inadequacy and complexity of the Ghanaian land tenure system can be highlighted. This will suffice for the purposes of the present analysis that aims to establish who was legally required to pay compensation, and the foreseeability in 2003-2004 of the damage incurred by uncompensated households. This issue of legal entitlements is key for understanding the true extent of vulnerability of the local population and some difficulties the company confronted.
Deficiencies of local laws and uncertainty on legal entitlements are often encountered in less developed countries, so this discussion carries insights to CSR evaluations in other industries and countries.
Legal framework for expropriation of land
The Constitution of Ghana (1992) lays down the right to private property (Art.
18) and the principle of prompt, fair and adequate compensation. 27 Despite seemingly clear constitutional safeguards, farmers at Ahafo actually received no compensation for land. That was due to legal loopholes and the complexities of the Ghanaian land system.
28
Under the 1986 Mining Law, it is the government who takes over the land.
29
The law provided for the compensation of various losses, but deliberately omitted land per se from the list. 30 As the RAP notes, 'No Act provides for compensation for the land itself.'
31
To properly understand expropriation in Ghana, the mining law is read in conjunction with the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125) 32 and the Administration of Lands Act,
(Act 123)
. 33 There is a significant difference between Act 123 and Act 125 in terms of compensation: while the latter provides for lump sum compensation, 34 the former provides only for annual payments (e.g. royalties) to land owners, which importantly are not individual farmers or families but the traditional authorities.
All indications point to the government using Act 123 to acquire land which to some it appears as expropriation in disguise and without proper compensation. This seems important because if the land at Ahafo was vested in the President, that appears to provide yet another legal ground facilitating the conversion of land from agriculture to mining purposes without proper compensation or consultation of affected communities.
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In fact, the legal status of land came up in discussions between the mine and local population as early as 1998. 51 There the chiefs and farmers asked questions about compensation for land and were explained that the land is vested in the government. An official from the regional Land Valuation Board (LVB) explained the legal situation. 52 Compensation would come to traditional authorities in the form of royalties, rents, and 'drinks.' He further recognised that chiefs hold allodial title on land but the farmers have usufructuary rights; it is normally this later right which is lost during acquisition. The official reckoned that it would be prudent for chiefs not to collect compensation for land to the detriment of these rightholders but allow the usufructuaries to claim compensation for land they have been occupying over the years. 53 In another meeting, an assemblyman explained that under the mining law and There is a complex legal picture that emerges at Ahafo. Farmers had rights they could rely upon under customary law. However, the land might have been "vested", and thus administered by the government, in law if not in practice. 60 Furthermore, the 1986 mining law was silent on compensation for land per se and envisages compensation only to traditional authorities in forms of royalties and rents with people benefiting from development projects thus funded. The constitutional principle of prompt, fair and adequate compensation was questionably applied in this context 61 and more broadly the government seems to have a poor record on compensating for land. 62 The complexities and contradictions of the land tenure regime 63 apparently discouraged Newmont from seeking an equitable solution at the time 64 and added one more reason to go with the minimalist requirements of the law and pay no compensation for land.
Deference to the customary land tenure system
Why land-for-land compensation was not an option for Newmont? The World Bank recommends land-for-land for displacement taking place in farming areas. A high-level manager at Newmont argued: 'we were very concerned that we would not be as interventionist as we could be basically destroying the traditional system and land tenure rights. It sounds like an excuse but it really was one of the guiding principles: look, the system is going to work, there is land, people are going to have cash, they'll get land and get farming again.' 65 To be precise, the availability of cash refers to compensation Newmont paid for crops and structures as there was no cash paid for land. Along similar lines, the RAP notes:
Like the Company, these traditional authorities recognize the fact that, if the Company were to attempt to replace land for land for all households with farm holdings in the Mine Area, it would create additional problems that could effectively destroy the established mechanisms for land allocation and potentially cause serious inflation in the price of land in the area. Therefore, the Company will not purchase replacement farmland for economically displaced households.
Instead, the traditional authorities have publicly stated and made it known to Project-affected persons/households that they, the traditional authorities, have land available for allocation for those that need it… [and] have encouraged farmers seeking land for agriculture to come forward for consideration. Whatever the availability of land there was, the winning argument seems to have been 'why bother?' and the company was content to rely on a number of coping strategies for disposed farmers. It was about individual and collective self-help, of making use of uncultivated land and of traditional institutions.
According to the company, dispossessed farmers were expected to group themselves, approach their traditional authority and together allocate new lands -this 'is only one of several coping mechanisms available to farmers, but it is the only mechanism with which the Company can assist.' 69 Thus Newmont envisages that groups of farmers, together with their village traditional leader, would approach their chiefs and present their needs for land; the company would facilitate the grouping of farmers and assist in land allocation performed by traditional authorities. As the RAP recounted, the company expected traditional leaders to make land available; the company would then play a facilitating role. 70 Furthermore, the company expected that 'impacted farmers may be coping with cultivated land losses by clearing their own fallow lands or by clearing fallow land held by members of their extended family.' 71 Candidly acknowledged is that 'The Company has not inventoried the total landholdings of resident and non-resident households, and as a result is not in a position to assess how significant a loss the Mine Area is to these households (i.e.
how much of their total landholdings are lost), and therefore how "easy" it will be for them to cope.' 72 In sum, Newmont counted heavily on self help and coping strategies: farmers were to clear fallow land on own family land and use it for agricultural production, to contact chiefs to get new land from stool land, and to enter tenancy agreements with owners of their choice.
Aligned with the industry custom
One of the early measures Newmont undertook in Ghana was to assess how its peers in the mining industry handled compensation. Company employees went on information tours at other mines and a Ghanaian industry insider was hired as the top negotiating manager at At that time we'd sit down and we'd talk but the problem was that it did not exist in the laws of Ghana. At the end of the day we did not have any basis to tell the company that people lost land because all they were saying 'this is the law, you have it in your own country, no compensation for land' and they were saying that A study of mining in Ghana hinted at these dynamics in the different context of compensation for crops. There the government through the Land Valuation Board (LVB) applies its own method of valuing crops which is widely criticised in Ghana as grossly inadequate.
Mining companies in Ghana face a difficult choice. Should they view the LVB compensation levels as a fixed requirement or merely a minimum level of acceptable compensation? Opinion within the Ghanaian mining community is divided. Both Newmont and AngloGold Ashanti stated during interviews that they adhere to GCG (Ghanaian Central Government) compensation policies and do not provide more. Newmont, in particular, indicated that it feels uncomfortable providing compensation in excess of the amount prescribed by law. It fears that doing so would set a negative precedent and create problems with the GCG and the communities in which it operates.
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A manager at Newmont commented on the more recent experience of Newmont with its peers.
Thus, commenting on state owned enterprises, he said:
we organise occasionally workshops on land resettlement and compensation and entities like DRA (the governmental electricity authority), the highway authority… you know, they have to put up their way of operating against mining companies, like us and Gold Fields, and not necessarily liking it because they have to go through much more trouble than they used to before:
"oh bring the police in and move them out". Without being a direct participant in the negotiations, he said:
'I don't think it was a failure. I think it was a corporate decision that has now come back to bite us. Bota was the man who executed it, but it was at the highest level -the priority was "just get the people off the land." … I'm sure he did not do it alone, he advised and was given the go ahead. He would not have done anything without authorisation… Yeah, they [Newmont] 94 The latter envisages providing rural, farming communities either replacement land (land-for-land), or cash (cashfor-land); as will be shown later, Newmont created a third category in the form of facilitating access-to-land seen as necessary for improving or restoring livelihoods.
Not contemplating consequences: spectre of famine
By 2005 newspapers reported that food production in the area went down drastically, the population doubled, and the cost of living raised -all due to the Ahafo project. People around the mine were interviewed and most were concerned about the affordability and availability of food in the area. 95 
Reactions to dispossession

Farmers
An OICI report noted that displaced farmers expected compensation for land itself, including in the form of cash-for-land, and manifested their disposition to continue farming elsewhere:
The farmers' concept of adequate compensation includes compensation for land and not only payments for crops and landed property destroyed... A lot of anxiety is expressed about being provided alternative land for farming activities. They even express anxiety about having to buy food if relocated as they currently feed from their farms. Most of these farmers have indicated that they cannot undertake any other economic venture. We could see that the land issue created all sorts of problems. Mining law says that all land belongs to government … that land could be taken for good -it was a very bad law. So some of us decided that we had to fight to have this law changed. So we took some of our men to Accra, we collaborated with TWN [Third World Network] and we had a press conference, we got the ministers, all those big men -the Minister of Mines, Chamber Of Mines and other peoplearound and had a press conference to send the message to them that Newmont is paying only crops, they are not paying for land and that the law was very bad ... there was a whole lot of problems because they were not paying for land, they were taking the land for free and for good.
Another aspect relates to the information that NGOs could provide to farmers at Ahafo who, it should be remembered, had no previous experience with mining and its impacts. Access to land is a major issue for both physically and economically displaced persons.
According to OD 4.30, the living conditions of displaced persons have to be at least restored and "land for land" approaches are the preferred option. In the case of the Ahafo project, "land for land" is the only feasible option to restore livelihoods. Without major modifications regarding access to land, compensation, and development projects, this project will not be in compliance with OD 4.30. 103 Furthermore, Newmont insists that there is no legal obligation for the company to provide land and that it is not prepared to purchase land for economically displaced persons. It will rather facilitate access to arable land through the traditional system. This process of facilitation will be monitored. This approach ignores the fact that gaining access to land through the traditional system entails costs for the households… Any costs related to that have to be born either by the state or the company.
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Detailed comments were made about a suitable land replacement plan; among them is also the issue of rights over land: 'We want to emphasize that to be effective in restoring long-term livelihoods, any land replacement strategy must provide security of land tenure or transferable usufruct rights to those people whose lives and livelihoods were irreversibly altered when Newmont Ghana took over the land they occupied to extract a profit from it.' 
International Finance Corporation
The IFC got involved at Ahafo well before granting the 125 mil USD loan to Newmont in January 2006. It seems to have been as early as May 2004. 106 Newmont was not in compliance with the World Bank's standard on compensation for land. Apparently the IFC raised concerns but they were rebuffed.
As the spectre of famine was rising the role of IFC became critical. Newmont acknowledged the instrumental role played by the IFC in helping them put together a package to firstly avoid impending famine and secondly to restore and improve livelihood of displaced populations. Newmont sought IFC's involvement less for the loan but for its expertise and stamp of approval. 107 After proper compensation according to World Bank's standards became a forgone issue, the IFC worked with Newmont on the encompassing issue of livelihood improvement.
I think they [IFC] recognised that at that point we decided we will not compensate for fallow land but they said 'ok, we recognise that it's going to be a problem so you guys you need to do a study of alternative ways of dealing with fallow land'… We, I think some of us accepted a long ago that we will have to compensate for fallow land but you know there were some harder hands (heads?) who said 'it's not required by law' and nobody has ever done it in Ghana. No mining company or anybody else for that matter.
108
A farmer representative recounts how farmers' expectations aligned with IFC's expertise and suasion. Deprived of legal backing to claim compensation for the land itself, farmers struggled for better compensation for crops during negotiations with the company, 109 within the framework provided by Ghanaian law; in addition, they expected some development assistance from the company to get back to farming:
At that time we were not hinting that we want compensation for land. We knew the law was bad so we thought that even if Newmont was not going to pay for land, we had to fight for better compensation for crops on the land... and suggest other programs that would help people to develop... When we even started fighting on this land issue, they said they paid for what the law demands they should pay. They were always quoting the law "this is the law and we are safe". would be in the best interests of the company to give people land to work on.
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Besides its expertise IFC also instituted a twice per year independent review at Ahafo. 112 As a result, starting with 2005, all programs the company undertakes at Ahafo are assessed by independent consultants and reports are publicly released on the corporate website. 
The aftermath: towards the livelihood restoration package
Newmont evolved its strategy in face of the hardship that land dispossession has caused.
When NGOs and the press warned that the area faces a risk of famine and the IFC confirmed the seriousness of the situation, the company changed gears and put in place a more comprehensive approach.
The land access package
Land is the centrepiece of any package aimed at restoring and enhancing livelihood of affected farmers. Newmont explains:
Under Ghanaian law and practice, the Company is not required to purchase required land, or to compensate for required land per se. Instead, the Company is required to compensate for assets affixed to the land: i.e., crops and structures. Notwithstanding its legal obligations, the Company recognizes that loss of land is of critical importance for impacted persons/households, particularly those with land-based livelihoods, and has devised a strategy to ensure the provision of replacement land in kind. 114 Newmont gradually developed its 'Farmland Access Strategy' which eventually came to contain three main land access assistance options: (1) Private Access to Land by using the customary sharecropping system; (2) Traditional Authority Land Bank with temporary and free access to community land for two years; and (3) Mining Area Land Bank with temporary and free access to company land for two years. i.e. people who lost land, be they physically or economically displaced. These programs will be introduced below to explain when they started, what they provide, and who is covered; a detailed presentation and a critical assessment are beyond the scope of this article. subsequently it also aimed to strengthen groups and farmer associations in the production of five crops (chilli pepper, soybean, ginger, maize, and plantain) which have high productivity potentials and ready markets. Training is mainly for farming (productivity training and business skills training) but also for Small and Micro Enterprises (business skills training).
The AAGI project was targeted not narrowly on project-affected-people, but on directed affected communities (eight communities in South Ahafo). By 2009, Newmont reported that 2,600 farmers have taken advantage of this program. 130 The Ahafo SME Linkages Program (ALP) began in February 2007 as a theeyear program funded by Newmont and IFC. 131 It aims to support local small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The main components are local procurement (Newmont adopted a standard operation procedure to increase its buying from local businesses), local supplier development, and strengthening of business associations. 132 The program identified some SMEs that would benefit most from this initiative in the following sectors: agribusinesses, "hospitality" (inns, hotels and catering services), fisheries, and masonry and construction. 
Implications for the responsibility to respect human rights
How did Newmont's decision to not compensate for land and its subsequent change of course fare with the corporate responsibility to respect human rights? The responsibility to respect human rights has featured in CSR instruments such as the revised OECD Guidelines First, on the relationship between corporate and state responsibilities, the SRSG explains that 'the corporate responsibility to respect exists independently of States' duties', 140 such as the state's own responsibility to regulate on proper compensation for land. Following the law offers no defence to a company supposed to respect human rights; this is particularly the case when the law is dispositive rather than imperative. Indeed Ghanaian law did not prohibit the payment of compensation but it was merely silent on the issue; were the law imperative, issues of national sovereignty would arise. Newmont's falling in line with Ghanaian custom was not about satisfying the law, but the rest of the industry who was enjoying the status quo. It was respect for the status quo. Not only private industries might have a stake in the status quo but also the government itself, in its role of economic actor rather than lawmaker:
The land compensation system in Ghana is broken... The central problem is that the levels of compensation are too low. Yet the state has an interest in artificially keeping these rates low, because it is the largest entity required to pay compensation. By requiring high levels of monetary compensation, the state would circumscribe its own ability to engage in public works projects... For some issues, such as land compensation valuations and revenue management, it is clear why the central government would not wish to change the status quo. the ESR team at Ahafo, the breadth of the projects, the multistakeholder consultative and decision-making structures used, 147 and the advanced reasoning exposed by interviewed employees of Newmont.
Conclusions
In it took a minimalist approach to access to land 148 and generally avoided being bogged down in every-single-thing-you-lost will be replaced or otherwise compensated individually. Newmont appeared to acknowledge that it irrevocably breached the responsibility to respect the right to property and consequently looked to the future to ensure it fulfilled its responsibility to respect livelihood rights, that is, those economic and social rights undermined by dispossession. To that end it pursued a systematic approach to development centred on economic empowerment measures, social services through the ASRA Fund and on strong relationships with all stakeholders having a role in the directly affected communities. There is a contrast between the complexity, long-term and rather advanced type of assistance , which allows for a mining lease of 30 years to commence. The interviewee considered this reasoning introduces a distinction which is shallow and without merit. During this period the owner cannot effectively deal with the land as s/he pleases (e.g. enter into a tenancy agreement or exercise any right consistent with his/her title or interest in land); de facto, if not de jure, acquisition has taken place. The study by Kotey and colleagues which contains a thorough review of the legislative framework and case-law and finds that Section 10 of Act 123 'falls short of the stated objectives of the constitution on the mode of compulsory acquisition, conditions for its validity and the determination of the payment of compensation as stated in Article 20(1) of the constitution.' N.A. Kotey et al, supra note 34. 38 Under PNDCL 153, annual rents were $0.30/km2 for reconnaissance and prospecting lease holders and $0.65/km2 for mining lease holders. George Botchie et al, supra note 29. 39 Under mining regulations applicable at the time (PNDCL 153 and its subsidiary legislative instrument, LI 1349 of 1987) royalties were set at between 3% and 12% of the mines' gross mineral. George Botchie et al, supra note 29. Emmanuel Aubynn notes that royalties are set at 3% of the gross sales of companies. Of all royalties paid, 80% go to the central government's Consolidated Fund and 10% are set aside for the development of governmental and academic institutions involved in mining sector support. Thus only the remaining 10% of royalties reach local populations where they are further split according to the following formula: 6% to the District Administration that hosts mining companies, 2% to the Traditional Council (a body of traditional rulers in the District) and 2% to all the local chiefs of communities whose lands fall within the spheres of influence of the mines. Emmanuel Ato Aubynn, Community Perceptions of Mining: An Experience from Western Ghana, Master thesis, Department of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences, University of Alberta, 2003. 40 'Communities' share of royalties are not only insignificant to carry out any meaningful development, but also misapplied by local community leaders. Emmanuel Ato Aubynn, supra note 39 (references omitted). See also Theresa Garvin et al, 'Community-company relations in gold mining in Ghana,' Journal of Environmental Management 90 (2009) 571-586. 41 Botchie and colleagues summarize the situation by noting that royalties 'are largely used by individual chiefs for their personal benefit, without any consideration for the rest of the community. This has often generated resentment among community members. These concerns have been demonstrated in various forms, ranging from complaints to district political authorities and traditional rulers, mining companies and the government to violent confrontations with mining companies, and open defiance against some traditional rulers, leading to their destoolment and to court actions. There is also widespread disaffection among chiefs and traditional rulers about their share of royalty payments and land rents, while mining companies have in turn expressed discontent over the distribution and use of these funds. Some communities have also grown critical of their chiefs and the district assemblies over the use of their share of the royalties. Finally, there are also conflicts among traditional authorities as a result of jurisdictional problems discussed earlier over who should be entitled to royalties.
Royalties received by district assemblies are usually paid into the general revenue pool and no special attention is given to the development of local communities… The use of royalties returned to these districts is a source of worry not only to local communities directly affected by mining, but also to mining companies. Many companies blame what they perceive as excessive demands from these communities for development projects on the failure of district assemblies to use the royalties for any meaningful investment in these communities.' George Botchie et al, supra note 29. 42 'Ghanaian customary law begins from the basic tenet that all land has an owner. In fact, nearly all land has multiple owners, with a chief holding the highest title, and numerous other rights-holders claiming lesser rights of possession, use, or transfer. This embedding of the individual's land rights within certain group or secondary rights is perhaps the major difference between customary and Western property law. ' 45 Michael Carson and colleagues noted: 'While the allodial right to the land belongs to the community as a whole, individuals and families within a Stool can acquire land rights that cannot be overruled by allodial rights… Usufruct title is of unlimited duration, as long as the individual or family bloodline does not expire. Thus, the chief, in whom the allodial rights are vested, in theory, cannot unilaterally displace a usufruct holder.' Michael Carson et al, p. 30, supra note 3. 46 Kwame Gyan et al, p. 25, supra note 21 (italics added). 47 The reasons for vesting the land might have to do with uncertainty and conflict over land within and between traditional authorities. 'Brong Ahafo House Of Chiefs Want Right Of Lands,' ModernGhana, 29.04.1997, www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=598 48 Apparently this was the legal regime of lands acquired by Newmont: "customarily owned but state-managed lands". According to the RAP, 'land ownership in Asutifi District is legally vested in the government' as a result of Executive Instrument No. 46 of 1961. RAP, Summary, p. 4, supra note 8. 49 RAP, Chapter 3, p. 14, supra note 8. 50 Kwame Gyan explains the change in legal status once land is vested: 'Vested Lands ... are lands previously owned, controlled and managed by stools or families, which by an Executive Instrument, have been vested in the President. The term 'vesting' ordinarily connotes the transfer of the allodial ownership to the President as trustee, not simply the management and control functions of land administration. It signifies the non-derivative title to the maximum range of liberties with respect to ownership and use of land. Generally the vesting instrument confers on the President the normal incidents of vesting, including the execution of any deed, and authorizing the occupation and use of any affected land. The legal position appears to be that upon the publication of the executive instrument, the lands cease to be stool lands or family lands as defined above. It must be pointed out that the vesting of lands in one authority does not necessarily mean the absence of lesser proprietary interests in other parties in the same land.' Kwame Gyan et al, supra note 21. 51 Newmont reports that public involvement with the Ahafo South Project began with community meetings in March 1998. For minutes of various meetings, see "Attachment One -Summary of previous public outreach
